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Notes
PENNSYLVANIA NORTHWESTERN DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. ZONING
HEARING BOARD OF MOON TOWNSHIP:
AMORTIZATION OF NONCONFORMING
USES OR AMORTIZATION OF THE
POLICE POWER IN PENNSYLVANIA?
I. INTRODUCTION
A recurrent problem in modern land-use planning has been that of
balancing individuals' property ownership rights against municipalities'
need to enact zoning plans that comport with modern socio-economic,
geographical, cultural and political realities.' Of particular relevance for
purposes of this Note are the problems associated with eliminating non-
conforming uses. 2 A property use is deemed nonconforming when,
1. Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, 445 A.2d 1194, 1197 (Pa. 1982) (citing Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887)) (recognizing the problem and concluding that
"[t]he police power is fundamental because it enables 'civil society' to respond
in an appropriate and effective fashion to changing political, economic, and so-
cial circumstances, and thus to maintain its vitality and order"); National Wood
Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 414 A.2d 37, 42
(Pa.), appeal dismissed sub nom. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 449 U.S. 803 (1980); see also Butcher v. Bloom, 216
A.2d 457, 463 (Pa. 1966) (Bell, C.J., concurring) (concluding that "regional, so-
cial, and economic interests" in each state will "vary from State to State, since
each state is unique, in terms of topography, geography, demography, history,
heterogeneity and concentration of population, variety of social and economic
interests, and in the operation and interrelation of its political institutions");
David G. Drumm, Comment, Conforming the Nonconforming Use: Proposed Legislative
Relief For a Zoning Dilemma, 33 Sw. L.J. 855, 855 (1979).
For a discussion of the various means by which municipalities in Penn-
sylvania have attempted to meet the changing needs of their citizenry, see gener-
ally ROBERT S. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE FORMS (1970 &
Supp. 1989-1990).
For a discussion of how the problem has been addressed in other jurisdic-
tions, see generally 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (2d ed.
1976 & Supp. 1985); 6 PATRICKJ. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS (Lori
A. Hauser ed., 1991); 2 E.C. YORKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1965 &
Supp. 1977).
For a general discussion of the mechanics and constitutionality of zoning,
see infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
2. In Pennsylvania, the state government has delegated the power to zone
to local governments by way of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
(MPC). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-12100 (1972 & Supp. 1991). The MPC
defines a nonconforming use as
a use, whether of land or of structure, which does not comply with the
applicable use provisions in a zoning ordinance or amendment hereto-
fore or hereafter enacted, where such use was lawfully in existence
prior to the enactment of such ordinance or amendment, or prior to the
(161)
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although originally lawful, it no longer complies with a municipality's
new or amended zoning legislation.3 Nonconforming uses are problem-
atic because they hinder the realization of zoning's general objective,
which is to further the general public health, safety, and welfare. 4 For
the municipality to eliminate the use outright, without paying just com-
pensation, would constitute a taking. 5 Nonetheless, because zoning can
application of such ordinance or amendment to its location by reason
of annexation.
Id. § 10107 (Supp. 1991).
3. See Lebeduik v. Bethlehem Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 596 A.2d 302,
304 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (concluding that "[nonconforming uses] arise when
a zoning ordinance restricts a use previously permitted on the property"); Estate
of Barbagallo v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 574 A.2d 1171, 1173 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990) ("A nonconforming use is an activity or structure predating relevant zon-
ing restrictions or any pertinent amendments thereto.").
In layman's terms, a nonconforming use is "[a] building, structure or use of
land that is in existence and lawful on the date when a zoning ordinance or
amendment becomes effective prohibiting such use, but which 'nevertheless'
continues unaffected by such an ordinance or amendment thereto." Joseph A.
Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings and Structures by Amortiza-
tion-Concept Versus Law, 2 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1963). For the statutory definition
of the term "nonconforming use" in Pennsylvania, see supra note 2.
4. See Katarincic, supra note 3, at 2. ("Nonconforming uses ... are consid-
ered to be out of keeping with the desirable land patterns for the community.");
Drumm, supra note 1, at 855 ("[T]he continued presence of a use that is incom-
patible with the city's proposed development may seriously retard development
of an area."); Note, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regula-
tions, 9 U. CH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1942) [hereinafter Note, Amortization of Property
Uses] ("Professional planners and city officials now recognize, however, that the
fundamental problem facing zoning is the inability to eliminate the non-con-
forming use."); Kenneth E. Kulzick, Note, Zoning. Elimination of Nonconforming
Uses by Amortization, 2 UCLA L. REV. 295, 297 (1954) (arguing that court decision
permitting amortization was "a commendable recognition that the benefits of a
healthy, well-planned community can be effectively achieved only by elimination
of existing nonconforming uses"). But see Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale
and an Approach, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 107 (1953) [hereinafter Note, Nonconform-
ing Uses: A Rationale and an Approach] (suggesting that nonconforming use is not
significant obstacle to realization of comprehensive land use planning because
those uses that are not eliminated under nuisance law or eminent domain are
"least noxious" uses).
5. The United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "[N]or shall private property
be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just com-
pensation being first made or secured." PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
To the extent that an ordinance immediately extinguished a lawful vested
property right without providing a mechanism to compensate the property
owner, the ordinance would be unconstitutional as a "taking." Hoffmann v.
Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965) (en banc) (concluding that "[t]o our
knowledge, no one has, as yet, been so brash as to contend that.., a preexisting
lawful nonconforming use properly might be terminated immediately").
Similarly, in Bachman v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 494 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 1985), the
court concluded that "the continuance of nonconforming uses under zoning or-
dinances is countenanced because it avoids the imposition of a hardship upon
the property owner and because the refusal of the continuance of a nonconform-
2
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be viewed as a means by which municipalities can adjust the composition
of their respective communities to comport with modern socio-eco-
nomic, political, geographic and cultural realities, the continued exist-
ence of a use that does not conform to current zoning laws is an obstacle
to progress. 6
The problems associated with eliminating the nonconforming use
must, however, be balanced against the sanctity of private property. 7
One's right to use private property is not absolute.8 Nevertheless, in
balancing private property owners' rights with municipalities' power to
regulate private property, some courts have traditionally favored the
rights of property owners. 9 Other courts have emphasized municipali-
ing use would be of doubtful constitutionality." Id. at 1105 (citing Hanna v.
Board of Adjustment, 133 A.2d 539, 543 (Pa. 1962)).
At the time of this writing, the author is unable to find any cases that uphold
the immediate termination of a nonconforming use unless such nonconforming
use is a "nuisance" or has been "abandoned." For a discussion of the use of the
law of nuisance in eliminating nonconforming uses in Pennsylvania, see infra
note 32 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the law of abandonment in
Pennsylvania, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
6. Spahr-Alder Group v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 581 A.2d 1002 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990). In Spahr-Alder, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court con-
cluded that
[a] basic purpose of zoning is to ensure an orderly physical develop-
ment of the city ... by confining particular uses of property to certain
defined areas. With such a purpose nonconforming uses are inconsis-
tent... [sic] Even though zoning ordinances permit the continuance of
nonconforming uses, it is the policy of the law to . . .strictly construe
provisions in zoning ordinances which provide for the continuance of
nonconforming uses. Nonconforming uses, inconsistent with a basic
purpose of zoning, represent conditions which should be reduced to
conformity as speedily as is compatible with the law and the
Constitution.
Id. at 1005 (quoting Hanna v. Board of Adjustment, 183 A.2d 539, 543 (Pa.
1962)).
7. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (concluding
that "[a]lthough no precise rule determines when property has been taken ...
the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests");
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (concluding
that regulation of property rises to level of taking when it "goes too far"); see also
Board of Supervisors v. McClimans, 597 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
(same).
8. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
506 (1987) (holding that act which prohibited mining of more than 50% of coal
beneath certain statutorily defined structures is valid exercise of police power);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137-38 (upholding landmark preservation legislation,
effect of which was to prohibit appellant from vertically expanding building);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (upholding ordi-
nance that prevented appellants from mining on their property because of po-
tential safety hazards associated with such mining); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance, effect of
which was to reduce appellant's property value by over 75%).
9. For a compilation ofjurisdictions that give property rights greater pro-
tection in the balance between individuals' property rights and municipalities'
3
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ties' needs.' 0 Many municipalities have employed amortization to bal-
ance these two competing interests.II
In the context of nonconforming uses, amortization refers to termi-
nating an existing vested property right within a given period defined by
statute in order to comply with zoning regulations.' 2 Amortization,
properly employed, protects constitutional property rights and also
gives municipalities the required flexibility to alter often old and out-
dated zoning plans.' 3 Indeed, most states' highest courts that have con-
sidered the question have upheld the constitutionality of amortization as
a means of eliminating nonconforming uses.
14
needs, see the discussion of the minority approach to amortizing nonconforming
uses at infra note 17 and accompanying text.
10. For a compilation of jurisdictions that give municipalities greater lati-
tude in regulating private property, see the discussion of the majority approach
to amortizing nonconforming uses at infra note 14 and accompanying text.
11. "Under this method ... a nonconforming use, structure or building
must, within a stated period of time, be eliminated either by its termination,
removal, or appropriate modification." Katarincic, supra note 3, at 5. The MPC
neither defines nor directly authorizes amortization as a means of eliminating
nonconforming uses. For a discussion of how the MPC may implicitly permit
amortization of nonconforming uses, see infra notes 106-17 and accompanying
text.
Interestingly, the Pennsylvania County Code, a predecessor to the MPC,
expressly permitted the amortization of nonconforming uses. Specifically,
§ 2033 of Title 16 provided that "[t]he board of county commissioners may, in
any zoning ordinance, provide for the termination of nonconforming uses.., by
providing a formula or formulae whereby the compulsory termination of a non-
conforming use may be so fixed as to allow for the... amortization of the invest-
ment in the nonconformance." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2033 (repealed 1969).
For a detailed compilation ofjurisdictions employing amortization, see J.H.
Ghent, Annotation, Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 22
A.L.R.3d 1134 (1968 & Supp. 1991).
12. Although the MPC contains no such provision, several states expressly
permit the amortization of nonconforming uses in their Zoning Enabling Acts.
See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 6.66 (Colorado, Michigan and Illinois); 6 ROHAN,
supra note 1, § 41.04[2] (Georgia). However, the absence of such an affirmative
grant has, by no means, been widely taken to prohibit the use of amortization.
See Lamar Advertising Assoc., Ltd. v. City of Daytona Beach, 450 So. 2d 1145,
1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (same), petition for review denied, 458 So. 2d 272 (Fla.
1984); Oswalt v. County of Ramsey, 371 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(same); Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County, 392 S.E.2d 165, 169 (S.C. 1990) (up-
holding validity of amortization provision in municipal ordinance notwithstand-
ing absence of express affirmative grant in enabling legislation).
13. See Drumm, supra note 1, at 872 ("Not only does amortization involve
the application of the balancing approach to the nonconforming use problem,
but the recognition that the amortization period may serve as compensation to
validate an otherwise invalid ordinance provides needed flexibility.").
14. See, e.g., Mayor of New Castle County v. Rollins Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., 475 A.2d 355, 360 (Del. 1984) (upholding ordinance that provided three-
year amortization period to terminate nonconforming signs); Spurgeon v. Board
of Comm'rs, 317 P.2d 798, 806 (Kan. 1957) (upholding ordinance that provided
two-year amortization period in which to terminate auto wrecking business);
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 121 So. 613, 617 (La.) (upholding
ordinance that provided one year in which to terminate nonconforming grocery
[Vol. 37: p. 161
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Recently, in Pennsylvania Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hear-
ing Board of Moon Township, 15 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ad-
dressed, for the first time, whether a zoning ordinance that provides for
the amortization of a nonconforming use is violative of the Pennsylvania
Constitution as a "taking" of property without just compensation.' 6
The court joined a distinct minority of state courts in holding that the
amortization and discontinuance of a nonconforming use is per se confis-
catory and violative of the state's constitution.
1 7
store), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929); Harris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 371 A.2d
706, 712 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (upholding ordinance that provided eight-year
amortization period for termination of nonconforming multi-unit dwellings),
cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977); Wolf v. City of Omaha, 129 N.W.2d 501, 515
(Neb. 1964) (upholding seven-year amortization period in which to terminate
dog kennel); Lachapelle v. Town of Goffstown, 225 A.2d 624, 627 (N.H. 1967)
(upholding ordinance requiring termination within one year of nonconforming
motor vehicle junkyards); State v. Joyner, 211 S.E.2d 320, 325 (N.C.) (upholding
ordinance that provided a three-year amortization period in which to terminate
nonconforming junk yards), appeal dismissed sub nom. Joyner v. North Carolina,
422 U.S. 1002 (1975); Collins v. City of Spartanburg, 314 S.E.2d 332, 333 (S.C.
1984) (upholding five-year amortization period for storage yards, auto wrecking
yards, and auto junkyards); City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 778
(Tex. 1972) (upholding ordinance that provided 25 years in which to terminate
nonconforming commercial uses), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 901; City of Seattle
v. Martin, 342 P.2d 602, 604 (Wash. 1959) (upholding ordinance that provided
one-year amortization period in which to terminate vacant lot used to repair
construction equipment).
15. 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991).
16. Id. at 1373. The court considered two constitutional provisions to be
relevant to the issue presented in Pennsylvania Northwestern: Article 1, § 1 and
Article 1, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Article 1, § 1 provides in perti-
nent part: "All men ... have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of... possessing and protecting property .... PA. CONST. art.
1, § 1. For the text of Article 1, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra
note 5.
17. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1376 (citing PA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 1). The proposition that amortization of a nonconforming use is per se uncon-
stitutional has been embraced by several states' highest courts. See James J.F.
Loughlin Agency, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 348 A.2d 675, 678 (Conn. 1974)
(invalidating, as ultra vires, ordinance that provided five-year period in which to
amortize nonconforming signs); Ailes v. Decatur County Area Planning
Comm'n, 448 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 (Ind. 1983) ("We hold, however, that an ordi-
nance prohibiting any continuation of an existing lawful use within a zoned area
regardless of the length of time given to amortize that use is unconstitutional as
the taking of property without due process of law and an unreasonable exercise
of the police power."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Hoffmann v. Kinealy,
389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965) (en banc) (concluding that "[the court] cannot
embrace the doctrine espoused by advocates of the amortization technique that
there is no material distinction between regulating the future use of property
and terminating pre-existing lawful nonconforming uses"); United Advertising
Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 93 A.2d 362, 366-67 (N.J. 1952) (invalidating, as
ultra vires, ordinance that provided two years in which to amortize nonconform-
ing signs); City of Akron v. Chapman, 116 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ohio 1953) (munici-
pal ordinance permitting termination of nonconforming use after expiration of a
"reasonable time" constitutes "depriv[ation] of... property without due pro-
cess of law" (emphasis deleted)).
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This Note proposes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in its fer-
vor to protect property rights against governmental encroachment, ig-
nored and misconstrued precedent. On a broader level, this Note
proposes that the court's holding is inconsistent with previous decisions
that upheld governmental regulation of vested property rights as valid
exercises of police power.' 8 This Note concludes by suggesting that the
Pennsylvania Northwestern decision will not only hinder effective land-use
planning, but will also adversely affect individuals' ability to freely use
their property.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Genesis of Euclidian Zoning
Before attempting to assess the various methods by which munici-
palities have implemented change in light of existing zoning plans, it is
first essential to trace the genesis of zoning as a means of land-use plan-
ning. The Supreme Court established the foundation for modern zon-
ing in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 19 In Euclid, the Village of
Euclid, Ohio passed an ordinance that effectively prohibited Ambler Re-
alty Co., a developer, from using the developer's land for commercial
purposes.2 0 The issue before the Court was whether the ordinance was
a valid exercise of the police power, and thus constitutional, or con-
18. For examples of Pennsylvania courts permitting regulation of vested
property rights, see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). It is important to note that the ordinance at issue
in Euclid had "prospective, rather than retroactive effect;" that is, it regulated
the way property could be used in the future. Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Ra-
tionale and an Approach, supra note 4, at 102. Thus, Euclid did not consider the
validity of the retroactive application of a zoning law. Id. Eliminating a noncon-
forming use through amortization involves retroactive application of a zoning
ordinance. Courts that adopt the minority position, such as that adopted in
Pennsylvania Northwestern, rely heavily on the distinction between the prospective
and retroactive application of a zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Hoffmann, 389
S.W.2d at 753 ("W]e cannot embrace the doctrine espoused by advocates of the
amortization technique that there is no material distinction between regulating
the future use of property and terminating pre-existing lawful nonconforming
uses."). In contrast, majority jurisdictions dismiss the distinction as "merely one
of degree." See, e.g., Mayor of New Castle County v. Rollins Outdoor Advertis-
ing, Inc., 475 A.2d 355, 357 (Del. 1984) ("The distinction between an ordinance
that restricts future uses and one that requires existing uses to stop after a rea-
sonable time, is not a difference in kind but one of degree .... " (quoting Grant
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 129 A.2d 363, 369 (Md. 1957))).
For a general discussion of Euclid, see RYAN, supra note 1, §§ 3.1.3, 3.1.8,
3.6.3.
20. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384. "[The ordinance] establish[ed] a comprehen-
sive zoning plan for regulating and restricting the location of trades, industries,
apartment houses, two-family houses [and] single family houses ....... Id. at
379-80. Under the ordinance, the Village of Euclid, Ohio was divided into six
classes of use districts. Id. at 380. Appellee's land, which appellee owned prior
to the ordinance's enactment, was later classified as U-2, U-3 and U-6. Id. at
382. None of these classifications permitted appellee to build a multi-unit apart-
6
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versely, whether the ordinance constituted a taking, and was thus uncon-
stitutional.2 1 Notwithstanding that the ordinance reduced the value of
Ambler Realty Co.'s property by seventy-five percent, the Court con-
cluded that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the village's police
power. 22 Thus, Euclid established the constitutionality of zoning as a
means of land-use planning.
The Court's Euclid decision was refined by later decisions which es-
tablish that, unless the legislation at issue deprives the owner of all rea-
sonable use of the property in question, the legislation is within the
state's police power. 2 3 Although Euclid implicitly established that legis-
ment house on the land, which was the use intended by the appellee when the
land was first acquired. Id. at 380-81.
Appellee was unable to attack the ordinance on the ground that it consti-
tuted a taking as applied to appellee's property because appellee had not ap-
plied for a building permit or sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of
the ordinance. Id. at 370. Accordingly, appellee challenged the ordinance as per
se unconstitutional. Id.
21. Id. at 386. The ordinance significantly reduced the value of appellee's
land. Id. at 384. The land was "in the path" of land being used for industrial
purposes and would have been worth $10,000 per acre if zoned for industrial
use, whereas the land was only worth $2,500 per acre if zoned for residential
use. Id. Accordingly, the ordinance reduced the potential value of the land by
75%. The Court stated: "The question is whether the ordinance is invalid in
that it violates the constitutional protection to the right of property in the appel-
lee by attempted regulations under the guise of police power, which are unrea-
sonable and confiscatory?" Id. at 386. In the Court's view, a 75% reduction in
value was neither unreasonable nor confiscatory. Id. at 397.
22. Id. at 395. The Court concluded that "the reasons are sufficiently co-
gent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be
declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." Id. Specifically, the Court considered the following facts to
support the conclusion that the ordinance was rationally related to the public
health, safety, morals or welfare: (1) "the development of detached house sec-
tions is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses;" (2) "very often the
apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of
the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character
of the district;" (3) "the coming of one apartment house is followed by others;"
(4) apartment houses bring "the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic
and business;" and (5) apartment houses detract "from... safety and deprive[]
children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in
more favored localities." Id. at 394.
23. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Although the
Court held that a taking had occurred on the facts of Pennsylvania Coal, the Court
noted that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law." Id. at 413. For further discussion of Pennsylvania Coal, see infra
note 98 and accompanying text.
Notwithstanding the holding in Pennsylvania Coal, the precedents illustrate
that even a quite substantial diminution in value will not be construed as a tak-
ing. For example, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 497 (1987), the petitioners mounted a facial challenge to the constitutional-
ity of §§ 4 and 6 of the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act and regulations promulgated thereunder. Id. at 476-77. The
7
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lation could cause a significant diminution in the value of individuals'
property without amounting to a "taking," the Court's decision clearly
left many questions unanswered.
Specifically, the Court's decision failed to consider how to introduce
flexibility into the system to respond to the needs of property owners
who, for various reasons, seek to utilize their property for uses prohib-
ited by a given zoning ordinance. 24 Additionally, it is important to re-
regulations required that at least 50% of the coal beneath certain designated
structures must be left in place and not mined. Id. Petitioners' primary chal-
lenge to the legislation was based upon the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 474. As a result of the legislation,
petitioners were required to leave 27 million tons of coal (two percent of the
total coal deposits) in place in 13 mines between 1966 and 1982. Id. at 496.
Refusing to treat the 27 million ton parcel as a property interest separate from
the entire coal mine and distinguishing the case from Pennsylvania Coal, the Key-
stone Court held that the legislation at issue was a constitutional exercise of the
state's police power in that it did not deprive petitioners of all reasonable eco-
nomic use of the property. Id. at 498-99.
Similarly, in Penn Central, the Court upheld state regulation of private prop-
erty where a property owner was not deprived of all reasonable economic use of
its property. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124. The
legislation at issue in Penn Central was New York City's Landmarks Preservation
Law (Landmark Law), which required the owners of "designated structures" to
keep the exterior features of the building "in good repair" and to obtain the
approval of the Landmark Preservation Commission (Commission) prior to al-
tering or expanding the exterior structure of the building. Id. at 111-12. Two
other ordinances permitted the owners of landmark properties to transfer their
unusable development rights (TDRs) to other lots, thus mitigating the economic
loss property owners would suffer as a result of the regulation of their property.
Id. at 114. The Grand Central Terminal in New York City was designated as a
landmark property. Id. at 116. Penn Central Transportation Co. (Penn Cen-
tral), the Grand Central Terminal's owner, entered into a contract with UGP
Properties, Inc. (UGP) whereby UGP was to construct an office building above
the terminal and Penn Central was to receive a portion of the rents generated.
Id. Penn Central and UGP applied to the Commission for approval of their plan
to build the office building, but the Commission denied the application. Id. at
117.
The Court conceded that the Landmark Law deprived appellants of the
most profitable use of their land, but it also found that it did not deny them of all
reasonable economic use of the land. Id. at 120. Specifically, the Court noted
that Penn Central could increase revenues by utilizing under-utilized space
within the property or by raising rents. Id. Additionally, the Court concluded
that the TDRs mitigated the Landmark Law's economic burden on Penn Cen-
tral. Id. at 137. Accordingly, the Court held that New York City did not take
Penn Central's property through the operation of the Landmark Law. Id. at 138.
24. As a practical matter, states have provided much needed flexibility by
allowing municipalities to issue variances and special exceptions.
A variance is "an authorization for the construction or maintenance of a
building or structure, or for the establishment or maintenance of a use of land,
which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance." 3 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 18.02.
It is "a form of administrative relief from the literal import and strict application
of zoning regulations." Id. The language of the MPC indicates that the pre-
sumption is against granting variances. With respect to variances, the MPC pro-
vides that
(a) The board shall hear requests for variances where it is alleged
[Vol. 37: p. 161
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member that imposing a zoning ordinance on a previously developed
municipality almost necessarily means that certain property will no
longer be in compliance with the zoning plan as reflected in the ordi-
that the provisions of the zoning ordinance inflict unnecessary hardship
upon the applicant. The board may by rule prescribe the form of appli-
cation and may require preliminary application to the zoning officer.
The board may grant a variance, provided that all of the following find-
ings are made where relevant in a given case:
(1) That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions, in-
cluding irregularity, narrowness or shallowness of lot size or shape, or
exceptional topographical or other physical conditions peculiar to the
particular property and that the unnecessary hardship is due to such
conditions and not the circumstances or conditions generally created
by the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood or dis-
trict in which the property is located.
(2) That because of such physical circumstances or conditions,
there is no possibility that the property can be developed in strict con-
formity with the provisions of the zoning ordinance and that the au-
thorization of a variance is therefore necessary to enable the reasonable
use of the property.
(3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been created by the
appellant.
(4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the essential char-
acter of the neighborhood or district in which the property is located,
nor substantially or permanently impair the appropriate use or devel-
opment of adjacent property, nor be detrimental to the public welfare.
(5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent the minimum
variance that will afford relief and will represent the least modification
possible of the regulation in issue.
(b) In granting any variance, the board may attach such reasonable
conditions and safeguards as it may deem necessary to implement the
purposes of this act and the zoning ordinance.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910.2 (Supp. 1991). See also Whitpain Township Bd.
of Supervisors v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 550 A.2d 1355 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)
(interpreting statute that was in effect from 1968-1988 to require that party seek-
ing variance must show unique and unnecessary hardship (citing PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 10912 (repealed 1988))). For further discussion of how Pennsylvania
courts have applied § 10912, see 2 RYAN, supra note 1, §§ 6.1-6.4.12.
Similarly, the MPC permits municipalities to provide for special exceptions
in their zoning legislation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912.1 (Supp. 1991). A
special exception is a use that is permitted under an ordinance when all condi-
tions precedent to the applicability of the exception are satisfied. 3 ANDERSON,
supra note 1, § 18.03. In contrast to variances, the language of the MPC indi-
cates the there is a presumption in favor of granting a special exception. 1 RYAN,
supra note 1, § 5.1.5. The MPC provides:
Where the governing body, in the zoning ordinance, has stated
special exceptions to be granted or denied by the board pursuant to
express standards and criteria, the board shall hear and decide requests
for such special exceptions in accordance with such standards and crite-
ria. In granting a special exception, the board may attach such reason-
able conditions and safeguards, in addition to those expressed in the
ordinance, as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this
act and the zoning ordinance.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912.1 (Supp. 1991). For further discussion of special
exceptions, see 1 RYAN, supra note 1, §§ 5.1.1-5.1.3, 5.4.2.
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nance. 25 Euclid did not purport to, nor did it in fact, address how such
property was to be brought into conformity, if at all, with a new zoning
ordinance. 26 This is the problem of the nonconforming use. 2 7
B. Eliminating the Nonconforming Use: Traditional Approaches
Most commentators have taken the position that the nonconform-
ing use is a necessary evil that must be conformed as quickly as is consti-
tutionally possible.2 8 These commentators emphasize that the longevity
of the nonconforming use has hindered comprehensive land-use
planning. 2
9
Most courts agree that nonconforming uses are inconsistent with
the purposes of zoning and should be quickly conformed to existing
zoning plans. 30 Moreover, even those courts that are most protective of
nonconforming uses have conceded that such uses should be reduced to
conformity with existing zoning legislation as quickly as is constitution-
25. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 6.02, at 356.
26. See Drumm, supra note 1, at 859.
27. For definitions of the term "nonconforming use," see supra notes 2-3
and accompanying text.
28. See Note, The Abatement of Pre-existing Nonconforming Uses Under Zoning
Laws: Amortization, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 323, 323 (1962) ("[T]here is general agree-
ment that the fundamental problem facing zoning is the inability to eliminate the
nonconforming use." (quoting Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 129 A.2d 363, 365
(Md. 1957))); Drumm, supra note 1, at 881 ("The presence of a land use that is
grossly incompatible with the future development strategy of a growing area can
obstruct the orderly and rational growth of metropolitan areas."); Kulzick, supra
note 4, at 295-96 ("[T]o effectuate the general purpose of present day zoning
ordinances it is necessary to eventually end nonconforming uses."). But see
Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Approach, supra note 4, at 94 (sug-
gesting nonconforming uses are not as great a threat to realization of compre-
hensive planning as was originally feared).
29. See Drumm, supra note 1, at 863 ("Nonconforming uses have proven to
be more durable than the original zoning advocates anticipated."); Comment,
The Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, 7 STAN. L. REV. 415, 416 (1955) ("It was
thought that [nonconforming uses] would eventually disappear if their expan-
sion were curtailed, but their position as legally protected monopolies resulted
in prosperity and increased longevity.").
The longevity of the nonconforming use is due in large part to "the artificial
monopoly created for nonconforming uses by the zoning ordinance." See
Drumm, supra note 1, at 863. ("Rather than withering away, many [nonconform-
ing uses] have thrived because the establishment of zoning has bestowed on
them a monopolistic position by preventing the establishment of competing en-
terprises .... "); Note, The Abatement of Pre-existing Nonconforming Uses Under Zoning
Laws: Amortization, supra note 28, at 323 ("[Nonconforming uses] often tend to
prosper as never before under the monopolies given them by the zoning laws
.... ); Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Approach, supra note 4, at 94
("[N]onconforming uses, often granted by law a monopolistic position in their
neighborhood, have become more firmly entrenched with the passage of
time.").
30. For a compilation of courts agreeing with the proposition that noncon-
forming uses should rapidly be brought into conformity with existing zoning
ordinances, see supra note 14.
[Vol. 37: p. 161
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ally possible.3 1 Thus, most courts and commentators agree that non-
conforming uses hinder land-use planning. Although the need to bring
nonconforming uses into conformity is largely undisputed, the means by
which courts and legislatures have eliminated nonconforming uses con-
tinues as a source of controversy.
Prior to the advent of amortization, a nonconforming use could be
terminated only by the common law doctrines of nuisance3 2 or aban-
31. For a compilation of courts adopting the minority position with respect
to the constitutionality of amortization provisions, but agreeing with the major-
ity ofjurisdictions that nonconforming uses should be brought into conformity
with existing zoning legislation as quickly as is constitutionally possible, see
supra note 17.
32. In Muehlieb v. City of Philadelphia, the court defined a public nuisance as
an "unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public." 574
A.2d 1208, 1211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821B (1979)). Muehlieb maintained 20 dogs on her premises in viola-
tion of Philadelphia's Animal Control Law, which limited the number of dogs
one could house within a residential district to 12. Id. at 1209. Evidence was
presented at trial that Muehlieb's property contained huge holes filled with
green water that smelled strongly of urine and created an intolerable stench in
the area. Id. Additionally, one of Muehlieb's neighbors introduced into evi-
dence a cassette recording of dogs howling at 5:30 in the morning. Id. The
Muehlieb court concluded that Muehlieb's property was a public nuisance be-
cause "[maintaining the dogs on the property] unreasonably interfered with the
rights of Muehlieb's neighbors and local church parishioners." Id. at 1212.
Similarly, in King v. Township of Leacock, 552 A.2d 741 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989), the court defined a nuisance as "such a use of property.., as, irrespec-
tive of actual trespass against others or of malicious or actual criminal intent,
transgresses the just restrictions upon use or conduct which the proximity of
other persons or property in civilized communities imposes upon what would
otherwise be rightful freedom." Id. at 743 (quoting Groff v. Borough of Seller-
sville, 314 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974)). In King, portions of appel-
lant's property were boarded up because it constituted a safety hazard to
children, upstairs portions of the building were rotted out, the premises lacked
water and a functioning sewer system, the plumbing fixtures were rusted
through, the doors and windows of the building were largely missing, there was
evidence of rats on the premises and the yard was overgrown with weeds. Id. at
742. The court upheld the lower court's decision that the property constituted a
public nuisance. Id. at 743.
The preceding cases illustrate how nuisance law works to restrict the ways in
which individuals can use their property. A brief hypothetical illustrates how the
law of nuisance produces the same result where the "offending" property is a
nonconforming use.
Suppose ABC, Inc. (ABC) builds a tire manufacturing plant in section A-1
of Hypotown, Pa., which is zoned to accommodate tire manufacturing plants.
Two weeks after ABC obtains the necessary licenses to operate the tire manufac-
turing plant, Hypotown amends its zoning ordinance to prohibit tire manufac-
turing plants in section A-1. The use is permitted to continue as a valid
nonconforming use. The factory operates 24 hours a day and emits thick black
smoke from its plant. Each morning, Mark awakens, after a night of sporadic
sleep (due to the noise from the plant), only to find his lawn covered by a thin
layer of black dust from the plant. Arguably, the preceding facts can be charac-
terized as a nuisance. Notwithstanding that ABC owns a valid nonconforming
use, it can be forced to abandon the use if the use is held to rise to the level of a
nuisance. See Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375.
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donment, 33 by the government's exercise of its power of eminent do-
33. The theory of abandonment is at issue where the owner of a noncon-
forming use or building ceases to utilize the property for an extended period of
time, thus permitting the municipality to deem the use no longer in existence.
See 2 RYAN, supra note 1, § 7.3.1. For example, suppose Fred owns a parcel of
land in Villanova, on which he operated a bar and restaurant from 1975-1980.
In 1976, the land on which the restaurant was operated was rezoned for residen-
tial use only. Fred was permitted to continue to operate his restaurant on the
land after 1976 as a lawful nonconforming use. In 1980, a fire destroyed the
restaurant. In 1991, the restaurant still had not been rebuilt. Although Fred is,
of course, still the owner of the property, he may nonetheless be deemed to have
abandoned his lawful nonconforming use.
To establish abandonment, "[t]here must be evidence of intention to aban-
don." Pappas v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 589 A.2d 675, 677 (Pa. 1991); see
also In re Associated Contractors, Inc., 138 A.2d 99, 100-01 (Pa. 1958) (requiring
intent to abandon). Whether there is an intent to abandon "depends upon ex-
amination of all the various factors presented in a particular case." Epting v.
Marion Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 532 A.2d 537, 542 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1987), appeal denied, 541 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1988). Further, "the burden of proof of
abandonment is on the party asserting the same." Pappas, 589 A.2d at 677 (cit-
ing Faith Presbyterian Church v. Bensalem Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 538
A.2d 135, 137 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)).
The presumption against a judicial finding of abandonment is further evi-
denced by the principle that "minimal use of a nonconforming use is enough to
prevent a finding of abandonment." Rubin v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 578 A.2d
1372, 1374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). In Rubin, the court agreed with the Board's
finding that a nonconforming commercial business had not been abandoned
even though "[s]ubsequent to Harrington's discontinuance of production opera-
tions, no employees were stationed at the subject premises and few if any busi-
ness visitors had occasion to access the property." Id. The court reasoned that
"the infrequent usage of the non-conforming use, consist[ing] of 'casual visits'
... made by [Harrington's employees] when it was necessary to access the inte-
rior of the building.. . . '[constituted] minimal utilization... sufficient to per-
petuate its status as a non-conforming use.' " Id. at 1374 (quoting Kuhl v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 415 A.2d 954, 956 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)).
Further, merely altering the character of the use will not necessarily lead to
a finding of abandonment. For example, in Pappas, the court concluded that a
restaurant owner had not abandoned his nonconforming sandwich shop by con-
verting it to a full-service pizza restaurant. Pappas, 589 A.2d at 678.
For further discussion of the doctrine of abandonment as applied to non-
conforming uses in Pennsylvania, see 2 RYAN, supra note 1, § 7.3.1- 7.3.3. For a
more general treatment of abandonment as applied to nonconforming uses, see
6 ROHAN, supra note 1, § 41.03 [6].
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main 3 4 or through the doctrine of "reasonable expansion."' 35 However,
these doctrines have proven to be ineffective means of eliminating the
nonconforming use. 36 Abandonment and nuisance have only limited
application. 37 Eminent domain is also generally inadequate due to its
34. Eminent domain is the state's power to force private landowners to sell
the land to the state, provided that the state seeks to use the land for a public
purpose and pays the landowner just compensation. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain
§ 1 (1965). The Pennsylvania Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Munici-
pal and other corporations invested with the privilege of taking private property
for public use shall make just compensation for property taken ... and compen-
sation shall be paid or secured before the taking." PA. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
Thus, the government is only required to justly compensate property owners
where the taking of their property is for public use. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Ad-
justment, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (Pa. 1958). However, where the government is
merely regulating property under its police power, as opposed to taking prop-
erty for public use, it need not compensate the property owner. Pennsylvania
Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375. In Pennsylvania, eminent domain is also gov-
erned by statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to 1-903 (Supp. 1991). For
further discussion of eminent domain, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw §§ 9-1 to 9-7, at 587-613 (2d ed. 1988).
35. Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc., 542 A.2d 985, 988
(Pa. 1988). The doctrine of reasonable expansion permits the owners of a non-
conforming use to expand the use to meet certain changes in the community. Id.
If the expansion is found to be reasonable, the use remains a lawful noncon-
forming use. See Pappas, 589 A.2d at 678 (concluding that change in noncon-
forming use from take-out sandwich shop to full-service pizza restaurant was
reasonable expansion).
The doctrine of reasonable expansion would work to terminate a noncon-
forming use, however, where the expansion of a nonconforming use so dramati-
cally altered the nature or character of the use as to render it a different use. See,
e.g., Appeal of Gambone, 598 A.2d 620, 625 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (transfor-
mation of nonconforming apartments into tavern where transformation involved
expanding tavern vertically, and thus eliminating apartments, held to constitute
a different use); O'Kane v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 582 A.2d 716 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990) (construction of parking lot for use by tenants of nonconforming apart-
ment building held to be unreasonable expansion where parking lot was con-
structed on land adjacent to land on which apartment building was situated).
Further, the right to expand a nonconforming use is not unlimited in that
any expansion may not be detrimental to the public health, safety and general
welfare. Silver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 255 A.2d 506, 507 (Pa. 1969);
Dunn v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 573 A.2d 634, 636 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied,
593 A.2d 425 (Pa. 1990). For further discussion of the doctrine of "reasonable
expansion," see 2 RYAN, supra note 1, §§ 7.1.5-7.1.7.
36. See Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Approach, supra note 4, at
93 ("Eminent domain ...stand[s] as [an] effective, but limited tool[] for the
elimination of undesirable uses of property."). Abandonment is also of limited
use because it only applies in those instances where a property owner has mani-
fested an intention to abandon the use. For a discussion of abandonment, see
supra note 34 and accompanying text. Nuisance doctrine is also inadequate to
terminate many nonconforming uses. See Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale
and an Approach, supra note 4, at 94 (concluding that "[p]robably nuisance law
could not be brought into operation when the sole purpose of the prohibition is
to achieve uniformity in the neighborhood").
37. For discussion of these limitations, see the discussion of abandonment
and nuisance, supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
13
Gosin: Pennsylvania Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
prohibitive cost.3 8 Further, some commentators suggest that decisions
made at the local level, such as those regarding extending nonconform-
ing uses under the doctrine of reasonable expansion, are especially
prone to political machination.3 9 To the extent that this is an accurate
assessment of the reality of local politics, one cannot expect local zoning
boards to contribute effectively to terminating nonconforming uses. Ac-
cordingly, if nonconforming uses are to be terminated, the task falls
largely on state and local legislatures. 40
C. The Emergence of the Amortization Technique
One of the ways that legislatures have confronted the problem of
the nonconforming use is by utilizing the amortization technique. 4 '
Properly drafted, an amortization provision can serve as a useful way for
municipalities to avoid a taking challenge. 4 2 The theory underlying
amortization is that, by offering the owner of a nonconforming use a
period of time in which to bring the use into conformity, during which
time the owner enjoys an artificial monopoly, the owner will be able to
recoup a sufficient portion of the investment so as to bring the ordi-
nance within constitutional guidelines. 43 Further, at the end of the
38. Not only does eminent domain impose a cost on the government in
terms of the expenditure it must make to compensate the landowner, the Penn-
sylvania Eminent Domain Code also imposes costs on the government in terms
of time and money when the government seeks to exercise its eminent domain
power. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-401 to 1-411 (Supp. 1991). For example,
the government (condemnor) must file a declaration of condemnation in court.
Id. § 1-402. The filing of a security bond is also required in many circum-
stances. Id. § 1-403. The condemnor must also record a notice of the declara-
tion of taking in the office of the recorder of deeds. Id. § 1-404. Within 30 days
after the filing of the declaration of taking, the condemnor must give written
notice of the filing to the condemnee. Id. § 1-405. The condemnee then has the
opportunity to file preliminary objections to the declaration of taking within 30
days after being served with the notice of condemnation. Id. § 1-406. If the
parties are unable to agree as to the value of the property, the process may be
further lengthened as a result of the board of view process, under which the
property's value is determined. Id. §§ 1-501 to 1-511. Additionally, the con-
demnee can obtain appellate review of the viewers' decision, which results in
further government expenditures of time and money. Id. §§ 1-515 to 1-517.
39. See generally Orlando E. Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers
Must End: Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REV. 29
(1980).
40. See Drumm, supra note 1, at 863 ("The problems caused by the durabil-
ity of nonconforming uses require that affirmative [legislative] measures be
taken if the number of nonconforming uses is to be significantly reduced.").
41. For a definition of amortization, see supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
42. For a discussion of how properly drafted amortization provisions serve
as a useful way for municipalities to avoid "takings" challenges, see supra notes 4
& 11 and accompanying text.
43. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 6.67, at 508-13. Professor Anderson
concludes:
Municipalities which seek to terminate nonconforming uses
[Vol. 37: p. 161
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amortization period, the property owner may still utilize the property in
some other manner, and thereby recoup yet more of the investment in
the property.4 4 It is an established principle of law that a zoning ordi-
nance can impose a substantial diminution in the property owner's in-
vestment without amounting to a taking. 45 Accordingly, because the
owner has not been deprived of all reasonable economic use of the
property, where amortization is properly employed, the owner would
theoretically be unable to challenge the ordinance on taking grounds.
4 6
A majority of jurisdictions that have considered the technique have
held that amortization is a constitutional means of eliminating noncon-
forming uses. 47 This does not mean, however, that amortization of non-
conforming uses is constitutional in all circumstances. Courts following
the majority approach apply a multi-factor test to assess the reasonable-
ness of the amortization provision. 48 At its most fundamental level,
through amortization proceed on the assumption that the public wel-
fare requires that such uses cease, but that summary termination is ille-
gal, impractical, or unfair. They find a middle ground, between
immediate cessation of use and the indefinite continuance thereof, by
adopting regulations which permit the nonconforming users, or some
of them, to continue for a specified period, but which require them to
end the prohibited use upon the expiration of that period. The term
"amortization" is derived from the notion that the nonconforming user
can amortize his investment during the period of permitted noncon-
formity. It is reasoned that this opportunity to continue for a limited
time cushions the economic shock of the restriction, dulls the edge of
popular disapproval, and improves the prospects of judicial approval.
Id. at 508-09.
For examples of the courts' recognition of the proposition that amortization
provisions may provide owners of private property with the opportunity to
recoup a sufficient portion of their investment so as to render government regu-
lation of their property constitutional, see cases cited supra note 14.
44. If the property were leased, however, and the lease prohibited using the
property for anything other than the existing use, an amortization provision
would presumably be more prone to constitutional attack. Under such a restric-
tive lease, because the lessee of the nonconforming property would be unable to
alter the use of the property and thereby recover a significant portion of his or
her investment, the lessee can more forcefully argue that an amortization provi-
sion deprives him of all reasonable economic use.
45. For cases supporting the proposition that a zoning ordinance may lead
to a substantial diminution in a property owner's investment without constitut-
ing a taking, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
46. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Court con-
cluded that "[tihe application of a general zoning law to particular property ef-
fects a taking if [it] ... denies an owner [all] economically viable use of his land."
Id. (citation omitted). For further discussion of Agins, see supra note 7.
47. For a compilation of cases in which courts have upheld the amortization
of nonconforming uses, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
48. Art Neon Co. v. City of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). The court noted:
In the application of the reasonableness test to the legislative de-
termination, the courts have used a variety of factors, and combinations
thereof. These include the nature of the nonconforming use, the char-
acter of the structure, the location, what part of the individual's total
15
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therefore, the issue is one of balancing the public gain against the pri-
vate lOSS. 4 9
The multi-factor balancing approach employed by a majority of
courts is illustrated by Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle.50 In Northend
Cinema, the Washington Supreme Court considered whether a ninety-
day amortization provision for adult theaters constituted a taking of
property without just compensation. 5' Seeking to respond to the "at-
traction of transients, parking and traffic problems, increased crime, de-
creasing property values, and interference with parental responsibilities
for children" 5 2 resulting from the establishment of three adult book-
stores located in primarily residential areas, Seattle passed two zoning
ordinances that gave the theaters ninety days to cease operating at their
present locations.5 3 In affirming the decision of the lower court, the
Washington Supreme Court concluded that a municipality has "the
power ... to require termination of nonconforming uses within a rea-
sonable period of time."'5 4 The court then concluded that the ninety-
day amortization period was reasonable with respect to Northend Cin-
ema, Inc., because its lease was terminable at will or on short notice, it
was not bound by the lease to show adult films and "whatever costs it
ha[d] expended for improvements to the building or necessary equip-
ment had been completely recovered through depreciation or were con-
templated to be left as property of the lessor." 5 5 Thus, under the
business is concerned, the time periods, salvage, depreciation for in-
come tax purposes, and depreciation for other purposes, and the mo-
nopoly or advantage, if any, resulting from the fact that similar new
structures are prohibited in the same area.
Id.
It should be noted that when an amorization provision is challenged, the
party contesting the validity of the ordinance has the burden of proving its inva-
lidity. Id. at 121 (concluding that contestant has a "heavy burden"); City of
Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Tex. 1972) ("[Clomplainant ...
was under the burden of showing that no conclusive, or even fairly issuable facts
or conditions exist in support of exercise of the police power."), appeal dismissed,
411 U.S. 901 (1973).
49. Art Neon Co., 488 F.2d at 121 (advocating balancing burden on individ-
ual against benefit to the public as test to determine validity of amortizing non-
conforming uses). See generally, Annotation, supra note 11, at 1141-44.
50. 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
51. Id. at 1154.
52. Id. at 1155.
53. Id. at 1155-56. The court noted that the effect of the ordinance was to
create a land use known as Adult Motion Picture Theaters, to prohibit that use in
most city zones and to require termination of all nonconforming uses within 90
days of the date the use becomes nonconforming. Id. at 1156.
54. Id. at 1159 (citing City of Seattle v. Martin, 342 P.2d 602 (Wash. 1959)).
The court further concluded that "[wie adopted a balancing test to determine
the reasonableness of the termination period, that is, whether the harm or hard-
ship to the user outweighs the benefit to the public to be gained from termina-
tion of the use." Id. at 1159-60.
55. Id. at 1160. The statute was reasonable as to Gaiety Theaters, Inc. for
[Vol. 37: p. 161
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balancing test, the amortization provision was reasonable as applied to
the theater.
By contrast, several jurisdictions have expressly rejected amortiza-
tion as a means of eliminating nonconforming uses. 56 For example, in
Hoffmann v. Kinealy,5 7 the appellants maintained lots for the open-air
storage of lumber, building materials and construction equipment. 58
The City of St. Louis promulgated an ordinance that rendered appel-
lants' property use nonconforming.5 9 The ordinance gave appellants
six years in which to comply with the ordinance by terminating the non-
conforming use.60 Confronted for the first time with the issue of
whether amortization constituted a valid means by which to eliminate a
prior, lawful nonconforming use, the Missouri Supreme Court con-
cluded that amortization of nonconforming uses constituted a taking of
property without just compensation. 6 1
Prior to Pennsylvania Northwestern, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had not directly addressed the question of whether amortization was a
constitutional means by which to eliminate nonconforming uses. How-
ever, the issue had been addressed by the lower state courts.6 2 In Sulli-
van v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania considered the question of the constitutionality of amorti-
zation as a means of eliminating nonconforming uses. 63 In Sullivan, the
the same reasons. Id. Moreover, the statute was held to be reasonable as to
Apple Theaters, Inc. even though it had entered into a three-year lease just prior
to the adoption of the ordinance. Id.
56. For a compilation ofjurisdictions that have expressly rejected amortiza-
tion as a means of eliminating nonconforming uses, see supra note 17. For fur-
ther explanation of the reasoning employed by courts adhering to the minority
approach, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
57. 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965) (en banc).
58. Id. at 746.
59. Id. at 747. Section 903.010 of the Revised Code of the City of St. Louis
provided: "No building or land shall be used for a use other than those permit-
ted in the district in which such premises are located unless (a) such use is per-
mitted by other provisions of this Chapter ... or (b) such use existed prior to
April 25, 1950." Id. Section 903.030 provided that "[t]he use of land within any
dwelling district for the purpose of open storage is prohibited." Id.
60. Id. Section 5B of Ordinance 45309, which was later codified by the Re-
vised Zoning Code of the City of St. Louis of 1960, provided that: "The use of
land within any dwelling district ... for purposes of open storage ... which do
not conform to the provisions of this ordinance shall be discontinued within six
(6) years from the effective date of this ordinance." Id.
61. Id. at 754-55. Specifically, the court stated that "[i]n our view of the
matter, termination of realtors' pre-existing lawful nonconforming use of their
lots for the open storage of lumber, building materials and construction equip-
ment would constitute the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation in violation of [the Missouri Constitution]." Id.
62. For a discussion of how Pennsylvania's lower courts assessed the consti-
tutionality of amortization provisions, see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
63. 478 A.2d 912, 918 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), overruled by Pennsylvania
Northwestern Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1374 (Pa.
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property in question had been owned by various members of the appel-
lant's family since 1912, and was used primarily for the open-air storage
of junk since that date.64 In 1961, the Philadelphia Zoning Code was
amended to provide a five-year amortization provision for "uses con-
ducted or maintained in the open air" in residential districts.6 5 Appel-
lant challenged the amendment on the ground that, inter alia, it was
unconstitutional under Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion in that it constituted a taking of property without just
compensation.
6 6
Reversing the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, the Com-
monwealth Court held that the amortization provision was not, on its
face, an invalid exercise of the city's police power, but rather was valid,
as applied to the appellant's property, so long as it was reasonable. 6 7
1991) (concluding that "Sullivan is not a correct statement of the law regarding
amortization provisions"). Additionally, the issue had previously been ad-
dressed by two Pennsylvania trial courts, each of which reached a different con-
clusion. See Concord Township v. Cornogg, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 79, 88 (1956)
(concluding that ordinance providing for six-month amortization period for
nonconforming signs violated Pennsylvania Constitution). But see Ammon R.
Smith Auto Co. Appeal, 79 York 145, 150 (1965) (upholding constitutionality of
ordinance that provided three-month amortization period for nonconforming
signs), rev'd on other grounds, In re Ammon R. Smith Auto Co., 223 A.2d 683 (Pa.
1966).
64. Sullivan, 478 A.2d at 913. The court also noted that there was one
structure on the property. Id. at 913-14. This fact was potentially significant in
light of the amortization provision, which provided that "[ror the purposes of
this provision, uses conducted or maintained in the open air shall mean those
uses conducted or maintained on land without buildings, or on land containing
buildings which cover less than 25% of the area of said land." Id. at 918. Be-
cause the structure on appellant's land only covered 10.3% of the property, ap-
pellant was not exempt from the ordinance. Id.
65. Id. at 918 (citing Philadelphia Zoning Code § 14-104(13)). The amend-
ment to the Philadelphia Zoning Code stated in pertinent part: "In all residen-
tial districts included in Chapter 14-200 of this Title, the following
nonconforming uses of land, as specified hereinafter, shall be discontinued and
shall not be resumed or maintained at the expiration of five years .... (1) Those
uses conducted or maintained in the open air .... " Id. In Sullivan, the use at
issue was "maintained in the open air." Id. at 914. Thus, on the facts of Sullivan,
the nonconforming use was to have been extinguished pursuant to the ordi-
nance, on May 1, 1966. Id.
66. Id. The court noted that although the appellant challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statute, he did not state the precise basis for his challenge. Id.
The court, therefore, "assume[d] that his attack [was] based upon Article I, Sec-
tion 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution." Id. For the text of Article 1, § 1 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra note 16.
67. Sullivan, 478 A.2d at 920. The court concluded:
[E]ach case.., must be determined on its own facts; and the answer to
the question of whether the provision is reasonable must be decided by
observing its impact upon the property under consideration. The true
issue is that of whether, considering the nature of the present use, the
length of the period for amortization, the present characteristics of and
the foreseeable future prospects for development of the vicinage and
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Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court remanded the case for an in-
quiry into the reasonableness of the amended ordinance. 68
Thus, for a period of seven years between 1984 and 1991, the only
Pennsylvania judicial pronouncement on the amortization issue was that
the amortization of nonconforming uses represented a valid exercise of
the police power so long as the amortization period was reasonable. 69
For those seven years, therefore, municipalities drafting ordinances and
attorneys counseling clients on how to comply with those ordinances
relied upon Sullivan as a correct statement of the law in Pennsylvania. It
is against this backdrop that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the amor-
tization of a nonconforming use is a valid exercise of the State's police




In November, 1984, Pennsylvania Northwestern Distributors, Inc.
(Pa. Northwestern) leased a building in Moon Township, Penn-
sylvania. 7 1 On May 4, 1985, after complying with all licensing require-
ments, Pa. Northwestern opened an adult bookstore on the property.7 2
On May 23, 1985, the Moon Township Board of Supervisors adopted
Ordinance No. 243, which "impose[d] extensive restrictions on the loca-
tion and operation of 'adult commercial enterprises.' 73 The adult
other relevant facts and circumstances, the beneficial effects upon the
community that would result from the discontinuance of the use can be
seen to more than offset the losses to the affected landowner.
Id.
68. Id. at 921.
69. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1373 (citing Sullivan, 478 A.2d at
920).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1370. The lease was for 36 months, but was contingent upon Pa.
Northwestern successfully obtaining all necessary licenses to operate an adult
bookstore on the property. Id.
72. Id. at 1370.
73. Id. at 1372. "The 'adult' businesses regulated by the Ordinance in-
cluded any establishment offering for sale any book, publication, file or medium
depicting nudity or sexual conduct or any movie theater which on a regular basis
showed 'X' rated films." Pennsylvania Northwestern Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 555 A.2d 1368, 1369 n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 584 A.2d
1372 (Pa. 1991).
The Commonwealth Court found that:
The Board of Supervisors in enacting the Ordinance indicated that
the reason for such regulation was that without regulation such estab-
lishments "(1) Tend to attract vagrants; (2) Tend to attract children,
especially those in their teenage years; (3) Tend to cause those who
traffic in obscene material, those who operate on the edge of law, and
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bookstore was an adult commercial enterprise within the meaning of Or-
dinance No. 243.74 Thus, following the ordinance's enactment, Pa.
Northwestern's adult bookstore became a nonconforming use. 7 5
Section 805 of the ordinance provided owners of nonconforming
uses with a ninety-day period in which to extinguish the existing use,
thereby bringing it into compliance with Ordinance No. 243.76 Seeking
to avoid having to terminate its operations, Pa. Northwestern brought a
legal challenge contesting the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 243. 7 7
Because Pa. Northwestern conceded that it was an "adult commercial
enterprise" within the meaning of the ordinance, the only issue was
whether the ordinance itself was valid as an exercise of the Township's
police power or, conversely, whether the ordinance constituted a taking
in contravention' of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 78 In a loosely rea-
soned decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Com-
monwealth Court and joined a minority ofjurisdictions, holding that the
amortization and discontinuance of a lawful pre-existing nonconforming
use violates the state's constitution. 79
those who operate clearly outside of the law to congregate or operate
in the community; (4) Tend to impose a law enforcement cost on the
community proportionately higher than other types of commercial es-
tablishments ... ; (5) Tend to attract similar commercial enterprises to
the vicinity of their location, thus heightening the potential adverse im-
pact of such establishments; (6) Tend to reduce the value and enjoy-
ment of nearby property, both residential and commercial; (7) Tend to
foster an environment not in keeping with other permitted and regu-
lated uses such as residential use . . .group care facilities, hospitals,
out-patient clinics, nursing homes, mobile home parks, schools ... rec-
reational parks, churches, etc.; (8) If located unreasonably close to
other 'adult' bookstores, adult theaters, massage parlors, or establish-
ments serving liquor, beer or other alcoholic beverages, tend to create,
extend or aggravate blighted areas; and (9) Tend to degrade the sanc-
tity of individuals and families in the community."
Id. at 1372 n.5 (citing Moon Township, Pa., Ordinance No. 243, § 805 (May 23,
1985)).
74. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1373.
75. Id.
76. Id. Section 805 of the ordinance provides in pertinent part:
Amortization. Any commercial enterprise which would constitute a pre-
existing use and which would be in conflict with the requirements set
forth in this amendment to the Moon Township Zoning Ordinance has
90 days from the date that the ordinance becomes effective to come
into compliance with this ordinance. This 90-day grace period is
designed to be a period of amortization for those pre-existing busi-
nesses which cannot meet the standards set forth in this amendment to
the Moon Township Zoning Ordinance.
Id. (citing § 805 of Ordinance No. 243).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1376. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that Sullivan was con-
trolling and that, under Sullivan, amortization provisions were not facially un-
constitutional, but rather were valid exercises of the police power if they were
reasonable. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 555 A.2d at 1372. The Commonwealth
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2. The Pennsylvania Northwestern Court's Reasoning
Before rendering a decision that, in the court's view, furthered the
sanctity of property, the court first addressed the decision of the Com-
monwealth Court in Sullivan v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.8" The Sullivan
court authorized a case-by-case evaluation of the reasonableness of
amortization provisions. 8 1 Under Sullivan, a zoning hearing board was
Court further reasoned that the reasonableness of an amortization provision is
to be determined by an inquiry into: (1) whether the ordinance granted appel-
lant a reasonable period of time in which to recover its investment in, or the
value of, the use of the property; and (2) whether the public benefit outweighs
the private loss. Id. at 1373.
The Commonwealth Court concluded that the 90-day amortization period
was a reasonable period of time for appellant to recover its investment in, or
value of, the use of the property. Id. at 1373-74. In evaluating whether the ordi-
nance gave appellant a sufficient period of time in which to recover its invest-
ment, the court concluded that neither expenses incurred after the ordinance's
enactment, nor litigation fees incurred in challenging the ordinance's validity,
nor expenses relating to permits, licenses, rent, insurance, salaries and training
of employees were to be considered. Id. Accordingly, the court refused to con-
sider that appellant had incurred over $90,000 in expenses since the ordinance's
enactment or that appellant had expended $55,000 in litigation expenses. Id.
Thus, the question before the Commonwealth Court was whether the amortiza-
tion provision provided appellant with sufficient time to recover its investment
in inventory, in fixtures that originally cost $16,000 and in a sign for which ap-
pellant paid approximately $2,600. Id.
The court concluded that 90 days was a sufficient period of time for the
appellant to recover its investment in its inventory, fixtures and sign. Most of
the appellant's inventory consisted of books and magazines that were published
monthly. Id. at 1373. Thus, the court reasoned, "[m]ost of [a]ppellant's inven-
tory would be out of date and unusable within one month." Id. Further, the
court concluded that, because appellant's property was located in a commercial
district, the fixtures (including booths, displays, shelves, cash registers, keys,
locks and light fixtures) could be sold to another business. Id. at 1374. The
court concluded that the sign could also be sold or could be used by the appel-
lant at another location. Id. Finally, the court noted that because appellant's
lease "[is] contingent upon [its] ability to obtain all necessary governmental
licenses," and because it is "unable to secure the necessary approval from gov-
ernmental authorities, it may terminate [its] lease without incurring liability for
such termination." Id. Additionally, the lease did not limit appellant to operat-
ing an adult bookstore. Id. at 1374 n.11. Accordingly, the Commonwealth
Court concluded, the ordinance gave the appellant sufficient time in which to
recover its investment. Id. at 1374.
The court appeared to defer to the legislature with respect to the second
factor in the reasonableness inquiry, that is, whether the public benefit out-
weighs the private loss. Specifically, the court concluded that, "[c]learly, the
Township has a substantial and legitimate interest here in enacting an Ordi-
nance regulating the location of'adult' establishments." Id. at 1372. Based upon
its conclusions that the ordinance provided the appellant with sufficient time in
which to recover its investment and that the public benefit outweighed the pri-
vate loss, the Commonwealth Court held that the ordinance was constitutional
as applied to the appellant. Id. at 1374.
80. 478 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), overruled by Pennsylvania
Northwestern Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1374 (Pa.
1991).
81. Id. at 920.
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to consider the following factors in evaluating the reasonableness of a
particular amortization provision: (1) the nature of the present use; (2)
the length of the period for amortization; (3) the present characteristics
of the vicinage; (4) foreseeable future prospects for the development of
the vicinage; and (5) other relevant facts and circumstances. 8 2
Because Sullivan was a Commonwealth Court decision, it was not
binding on the Pennsylvania Northwestern court. Nevertheless, as the Penn-
sylvania Northwestern court stated, "[its] scope of review in a zoning case,
where the trial court has not taken additional evidence, is limited to de-
termining whether the zoning hearing board committed an error of law
or a manifest abuse of discretion." s8 3 In Pennsylvania Northwestern, the
Zoning Hearing Board of Moon Township heard evidence with respect
to the relevant factors as set forth in Sullivan.84 Thus, as the Pennsylvania
Northwestern court concluded, if Sullivan was a proper statement of the
law in Pennsylvania, then the Zoning Hearing Board did not commit an
abuse of discretion and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would have
been compelled to find in favor of the Township. 85 Accordingly, a fun-
damental issue in Pennsylvania Northwestern was whether the Sullivan rea-
sonableness test was a correct statement of the law in Pennsylvania.
In determining whether Sullivan was a correct statement of the law
in Pennsylvania, the court began by conceding that property rights in
the Commonwealth are not unlimited.8 6 Rather, according to the court,
"all property is held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regu-
lation by the government, which regulation is clearly necessary to pre-
serve the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the people."'8 7
Notwithstanding this principle, the court concluded that the Sullivan
court's endorsement of amortization was an incorrect statement of the
82. Id.
83. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1373; see also Valley View Civic
Ass'n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 639 (Pa. 1983); Pyzdrowski v.
Board of Adjustment, 263 A.2d 426, 429 (Pa. 1970); Gross v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 227 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa. 1967); Brennen v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 187 A.2d 180, 182 (Pa. 1963); Dunn v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 573 A.2d 634,
635 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 425 (Pa. 1990).
84. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1374. The court stated:
Following [the Sullivan] standard, the Zoning Hearing Board
herein heard evidence regarding the impact upon the property in ques-
tion with respect to the nature of the present use, the period for amorti-
zation, the characteristics of the vicinage, etc., and determined that the
amortization provision was reasonable as applied. In this regard the
Zoning Hearing Board stated that the "real and substantial benefits to
the Township of elimination of the nonconforming use from this loca-
tion ... more than offset the losses to the affected landowner."
Id. (quoting Opinion of Zoning Hearing Board at 13).
85. Id. at 1374.
86. Id. For examples of Pennsylvania courts regulating vested property
rights, see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
87. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1374 (citing Anstine v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 190 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. 1963)).
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law in Pennsylvania.88
To support its conclusion, the Pennsylvania Northwestern court cited a
series of Pennsylvania cases in support of the proposition that "it has
long been the law of [the] Commonwealth that municipalities lack the
power to compel a change in the nature of an existing lawful use of
property."'8 9 If the Pennsylvania Northwestern court is correct in asserting
that a municipality lacks the power to compel a change in the nature of
an existing lawful property use, then Sullivan, which permits municipali-
ties to compel such a change, is an incorrect statement of the law in
Pennsylvania. However, as discussed in detail later in this Note, the
holdings in the cases relied on by the Pennsylvania Northwestern court do
not support such an interpretation. 90 Specifically, in the cases cited by
the Pennsylvania Northwestern court, the courts merely held that the state
may not deprive the owner of all reasonable use of property without
paying just compensation or prohibit the reasonable expansion of an
existing, lawful nonconforming use.9 1 Accordingly, the cases cited by
the Pennsylvania Northwestern court do not support the Pennsylvania North-
western court's conclusion that the Sullivan court's approach to the amor-
tization of nonconforming uses is an incorrect statement of the law in
Pennsylvania.
More specifically, the Pennsylvania Northwestern court posited that the
only lawful ways in which a municipality may terminate a nonconforming
use in Pennsylvania are through the use of common law nuisance theory,
abandonment or eminent domain. 92 Thus, under the Pennsylvania North-
western court's reasoning, it follows by implication that a nonconforming
use may not be terminated through mere governmental regulation of
property. Because nonconforming uses, like all other uses, are subject
to police power regulation, it is implicit in the court's position that when
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1375. For a detailed discussion of the cases relied upon by the
Pennsylvania Northwestern court to support its conclusion that the Commonwealth
lacks the power to compel a change in an existing lawful property use, see infra
note 122.
90. For an analysis of the court's application of precedent to support its
stated proposition that municipalities lack the power to compel a change in the
nature of an existing lawful property use, see infra notes 122 & 126.
91. For the courts' holdings in these cases, see infra note 122. For a discus-
sion of the limitations on the state's exercise of its police power, see supra notes
32-40 and accompanying text.
92. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375 (citing Gross v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 227 A.2d 824, 827 (Pa. 1967)). The Pennsylvania Northwestern
court stated that "[a] lawful nonconforming use establishes in the property
owner a vested property right which cannot be abrogated or destroyed, unless it
is a nuisance, it is abandoned, or it is extinguished by eminent domain." Id.
For a discussion of the elements of a nuisance action and the application of
the theory in Pennsylvania, see supra note 32. For a discussion of the abandon-
ment doctrine and its application by the Pennsylvania courts, see supra note 33.
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a municipality terminates a nonconforming use through amortization,
the municipality is taking as opposed to regulating property.93
The Pennsylvania Northwestern court recognized the inherent diffi-
culty in making a distinction between a taking and a valid exercise of the
Commonwealth's police power. 94 Accordingly, the court employed the
language of Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment 95 to serve as an analytical
framework for distinguishing takings from valid exercises of police
power.96 In attempting to make such a distinction, the court concluded,
"[a] 'taking' is not limited to an actual physical possession or seizure of
the property; if the effect of the zoning law or regulation is to deprive a
property owner of the lawful use of his property it amounts to a 'taking,'
for which he must be justly compensated." '9 7 Under this framework, and
in accordance with the reasoning of the Missouri Supreme Court in Hoff-
mann v. Kinealy,9 8 the court concluded that the effect of the Moon Town-
93. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375. The court concluded:
Neither the Executive nor the Legislature, nor any legislative body,
nor any zoning or planning commission . . .has the right-under the
guise of the police power, or under the broad power of general welfare
... to take, possess or confiscate private property for public use or to completely
prohibit or substantially destroy the lawful use and enjoyment of property, without
paying just compensation therefor ....
Id. (quoting Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 A.2d 709, 712 (Pa.
1963)).
94. Id.
95. 200 A.2d 408 (Pa. 1964).
96. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375-76.
97. Id. (quoting Cleaver, 200 A.2d at 412).
98. 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965) (en banc). In support of its holding, the
Pennsylvania Northwestern court quoted the following language from Hoffmann:
[I]t would be a strange and novel doctrine indeed which would approve
a municipality taking private property for public use without compensa-
tion if the property was not too valuable and the taking was not too
soon, and prompts us to repeat the caveat of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that "[we] are in danger of forgetting that
a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change."
Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1376 (quoting Hoffmann, 389 S.W.2d at 753
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))). Signifi-
cantly, both Hoffmann and Pennsylvania Northwestern are factually distinguishable
from Pennsylvania Coal. The issue in Pennsylvania Coal was whether the Kohler
Act, which effectively prevented Pennsylvania Coal Co. from extracting any coal
from one of its mines, constituted a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922). Unlike the Kohler Act at issue in Pennsylvania Coal,
neither the ordinance at issue in Pennsylvania Northwestern, nor the amortization
ordinance in Hoffmann, deprived the complainant of all reasonable economic use
of its property. See Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1376; Hoffmann, 389
S.W.2d at 753. Where legislation deprives one of all reasonable economic use
of one's property, the legislation is unconstitutional. Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (concluding that legislation regulating uses that can be
made of property effects taking if it "denies an owner economically viable use of
his land"); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978) (same). The ordinance will pass constitutional muster, however, if it im-
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ship zoning ordinance was to deprive Pa. Northwestern of its lawful
nonconforming use without just compensation.9 9 Accordingly, the
Pennsylvania Northwestern court rejected the Sullivan court's holding that
the amortization of a nonconforming use is a valid exercise of the police
power so long as it is reasonable.' 0 0 Rather, the Pennsylvania Northwest-
ern court held, the amortization of a nonconforming use is per se
unconstitutional. 101
B. Pennsylvania Northwestern: The Concurrences
Significantly, three out of seven Justices would have followed the
majority ofjurisdictions' approach regarding the constitutionality of am-
ortizing nonconforming uses. 10 2 More specifically, Chief Justice Nix
and Justice Papadakos, in concurring, and Justice McDermott, in par-
tially concurring, agreed with the majority as to the result on the facts of
Pennsylvania Northwestern. However, these Justices disagreed with the
majority of the Pennsylvania Northwestern court that the amortization pro-
vision at issue worked, on its face, a taking of property without just com-
pensation.10 3  Rather, in their view, "nonconforming uses [are]
inconsistent with a basic purpose of zoning [and] represent conditions
which should be reduced to conformity as speedily as is compatible with
the law and the Constitution." 10 4 However, the ninety-day amortization
period provided by the ordinance at issue in Pennsylvania Northwestern
was, in their view, unconstitutional as applied.10 5
poses a substantial diminution in value, but does not deprive one of all reason-
able economic use of property. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (upholding ordinance that decreased value of appel-
lee's property by 75%).
99. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1376.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1377-78 (Nix, C.J., concurring); id. at 1378 (McDermott, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Accordingly, because only one additional vote is neces-
sary to overrule Pennsylvania Northwestern, as the composition of the court
changes, it will be interesting to observe whether the court hears another amor-
tization case.
103. Justice Nix, joined by Justice Papadakos, "disagree[d] with the finding
that any provision for the amortization of nonconforming uses would be per se
confiscatory and unconstitutional." Id. at 1377 (Nix, C.J., concurring). Simi-
larly, Justice McDermott concluded, "I do not agree that pre-existing noncon-
forming uses are beyond reasonable regulation for health, safety and morals of a
community." Id. at 1378 (McDermott, J., concurring and dissenting).
104. Id. at 1378 (Nix, C.J., concurring) (quoting Hanna v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 183 A.2d 539, 543 (Pa. 1962)).
105. Id. at 1377 (Nix, CJ., concurring) ("I agree with the result reached by
the majority, that Section 805 of Ordinance No. 243 is invalid in this case .... );
id. at 1378 (McDermott, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Ninety days is too short
a period to erase a pre-existing use.").
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C. Pennsylvania Northwestern: The Court's Errors
The Pennsylvania Northwestern majority erred in renouncing the ap-
proach advocated by the Sullivan court as a correct statement of the law
in Pennsylvania. First, the court erred by not addressing the possibility
that the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) grants mu-
nicipalities the power to regulate nonconforming uses through amorti-
zation. To understand why it was erroneous to fail to address the
statutory implications of Pa. Northwestern's challenge to Ordinance No.
243, it is important to consider the source of a municipality's authority
to zone.
Moon Township's power to zone is derived from a statute promul-
gated by the state legislature. 10 6 Specifically, in Pennsylvania, the au-
thority to zone is derived from the MPC. 10 7 The MPC neither expressly
grants municipalities the power to amortize nonconforming uses, nor
imposes upon them a duty to refrain from so doing. 10 8 Nevertheless,
the authority to amortize nonconforming uses is arguably granted by the
text of the MPC.' 0 9
The MPC provides that "[t]he governing body of each municipality,
in accordance with the conditions and procedures set forth in this act,
may enact, amend and repeal zoning ordinances to . . . accomplish any
of the purposes of this act. '" 10 The MPC further provides that "[tihe
provisions of zoning ordinances shall be designed [t]o promote, protect
and facilitate any or all of the following: the public health, safety,
106. See Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 200 A.2d 408, 412 (Pa. 1964). In
Cleaver, the court concluded that:
Municipalities are not sovereigns; they have no original or funda-
mental power of legislation; a municipal or councilmanic body can en-
act only the ordinances and exercise only the zoning powers which are
authorized by the Legislature, and the Legislature can delegate or grant
only those legislative or zoning powers which are Constitutionally
permitted.
Id. Correspondingly, Moon Township's power to zone devolves from the Penn-
sylvania Municipalities Planning Code, promulgated by the state legislature. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-12100 (1972 & Supp. 1991).
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-12100.
108. See id. Several states' legislatures have expressly authorized amortiza-
tion as a means of eliminating nonconforming uses. For a compilation of these
jurisdictions, see supra note 12.
Interestingly, § 2033 of the Pennsylvania County Code provided:
The board of county commissioners may, in any zoning ordinance, pro-
vide for the termination of nonconforming uses, either by specifying
the period or periods in which nonconforming uses shall be required to
cease, or by providing a formula or formulae whereby the compulsory
termination of a nonconforming use may be so fixed as to allow for the
recovery or amortization of the investment in the nonconformance.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2033 (repealed 1969). This language is absent from the
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-
12100 (1972 & Supp. 1991).
109. See 2 RYAN, supra note 1, § 7.1.4, at 5-6.
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601.
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/5
morals, and the general welfare.""' Additionally the MPC states,
"[zoning ordinances] may . . . regulate . . . [u]ses of land."'1 12
The above language, taken as a whole, suggests that the MPC per-
mits the regulation of nonconforming uses where such regulation is
designed to "promote, protect, or facilitate the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare.""11 3 With respect to Ordinance No. 243, the
Commonwealth Court concluded that the Township of Moon had a
"substantial and legitimate interest ... in enacting an [o]rdinance regu-
lating the location of 'adult' establishments."' 14 Thus, under the reason-
ing of the Commonwealth Court, Ordinance No. 243 is a valid exercise
of Moon Township's zoning authority under the MPC. 115
Strangely, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court omitted any
explicit discussion of the MPC from its analysis in Pennsylvania Northwest-
ern. Why is this significant? After all, it can be argued that even if the
text of the MPC permits the amortization of nonconforming uses, the
MPC may be held unconstitutional to the extent that it permits such leg-
islative action. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to address the
relevance of the MPC to the issue in Pennsylvania Northwestern is signifi-
cant because the question of the validity of legislation is entitled to judi-
cial deference.' 16 Accordingly, if the General Assembly, by way of the
MPC implicitly authorized amortization as a means of eliminating non-
conforming uses, that legislative judgment is entitled to deference by
the court. Thus, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the
case on constitutional grounds, at the very least, the court should have
been explicit about how it reached the constitutional question." 7
Second, the court not only failed to defer to the state legislature,
111. Id. § 10604.
112. Id. § 10603(b)(1).
113. Id. § 10604.
114. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 555 A.2d at 1372. For a detailed description
of the interests that the Moon Township legislature sought to promote by way of
Ordinance No. 243, see supra note 73.
115. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 555 A. 2d at 1374. The MPC empowers mu-
nicipalities to enact zoning legislation where such legislation furthers the public
health, safety and welfare. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10604. From the court's
conclusion that Moon Township had a "substantial and legitimate interest" in
regulating the location of adult establishments, it can be inferred that Ordinance
No. 243, which regulated the location of an adult commercial establishment, fur-
thered the public health, safety and welfare. Because furthering the public
health, safety and welfare is the touchstone for validity under the MPC, implicit
in the Commonwealth Court's holding is that such amortization provisions are
valid police power regulations under the MPC.
116. For a discussion of the presumption favoring the validity of legislative
action in Pennsylvania, see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Mayor of New Castle v. Rollins Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 475
A.2d 355, 357-58 (Del. 1984), in which the Delaware Supreme Court first ad-
dressed New Castle's power to zone and then subsequently discussed the consti-
tutionality of the legislature's exercise of that power with respect to authorizing
the amortization of nonconforming uses.
19921 NOTE
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but it failed to defer to Moon Township's legislature as well. In Penn-
sylvania, "a presumption of validity attaches to a zoning ordinance." '" 8
Yet the court conducted its analysis as if the presumption was in favor of
the invalidity of Moon Township's zoning ordinance."19 Specifically,
the court appeared to overlook precedent that reasonably could be read
to support the Moon Township legislature's determination that requir-
ing the amortization of a nonconforming use is a valid exercise of the
Commonwealth's police power.120
The most important flaw in the Pennsylvania Northwestern court's
analysis, however, concerns the court's application of precedent to the
facts of the case. The court cited a number of cases to support the prop-
osition that "it has long been the law of this Commonwealth that munic-
ipalities lack the power to compel a change in the nature of an existing
lawful use of property."121 However, the court overstated the holdings
of these cases.' 2 2 Taken together, these cases merely stand for the
118. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1374 (quoting National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965));
see also Layne v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 460 A.2d 1088, 1089 (Pa. 1983). For
further discussion of the presumption of validity with respect to statutes, see
supra note 48.
119. For a discussion of how it appears that the Pennsylvania Northwestern
court erroneously conducted its inquiry as if a municipality bears the burden of
proving the validity of its legislation, see infra note 120.
Some commentators argue that a presumption of invalidity is appropriate in
light of the potential politization of zoning that occurs at the local level. See, e.g.,
Delogu, supra note 39, at 81 (suggesting that courts should closely scrutinize
municipal legislation because of extensive political machination occurring at lo-
cal level).
120. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 478 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1984). The Sullivan court recognized that there is precedent to
support the proposition that retroactive zoning legislation, such as that involved
in the amortization of a nonconforming use, is constitutional in Pennsylvania.
id.
For example, in Silver v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 255 A.2d 506 (Pa. 1969), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that owners of nonconforming uses have the
constitutional right to "mak[e] such necessary additions to the existing structure
as were needed to provide for its natural expansion and the accommodation of
increased trade." Id. at 507 (quoting In re Gilfillan's Permit, 140 A. 136, 138
(1927)). The Silver court recognized, however, that this protection is not unlim-
ited. Specifically, the court concluded that the proposed expansion must "not
be detrimental to the public welfare, safety and health." Id.
Similarly, in Hanna v. Board of Adjustment, 183 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1962), the
court concluded that "it is the policy of the law to closely restrict ... noncon-
forming uses and to strictly construe provisions in zoning ordinances which pro-
vide for the continuance of nonconforming uses." Id. at 543.
121. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375. For a detailed discussion
of these cases, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
122. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375. For example, the court
quoted an earlier decision for the proposition that "our law has long recognized
the priority that must be given to lawful nonconforming uses." Id. (quoting In re
Miller, 515 A.2d 904, 909 (Pa. 1986)). In Miller, the appellant, a homeowner,
maintained a boarding house for the aged, mentally retarded and physically
handicapped. Miller, 515 A.2d at 905. The home was in compliance with local
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/5
1992] NOTE
proposition that municipalities may not immediately terminate a prior law-
ful nonconforming use. 123 These cases did not purport to, nor do they
in fact, speak to the issue in the present case, that is, whether a munici-
pality may regulate a nonconforming use by requiring that property own-
ers terminate nonconforming uses after a period of time. A more
accurate reading of these cases is that they do not forbid compelling a
change in the nature of an existing use, but rather, that they merely for-
bid a municipality from compelling a particular kind of change. Specifi-
cally, these cases forbid a municipality from enacting a zoning ordinance
that requires the immediate cessation of a prior lawful nonconforming
zoning law until 1978, when Middletown Township amended its zoning ordi-
nance to alter the definition of family. Id. The effect of the ordinance was to
render appellant's home nonconforming. Id. at 906. Significantly, the issue in
Miller was not whether the Township could regulate property pursuant to its
police power, but rather, whether it could compel the immediate cessation of a
prior lawful nonconforming use. Id. Accordingly, although the court concluded
that the ordinance was invalid, the issue addressed is distinguishable from that
confronted in Pennsylvania Northwestern. Id. at 909.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Northwestern court quoted another case for the
proposition that the "continuance of nonconforming use is permitted to avoid a
wrong notwithstanding that the use is an obstruction to a public purpose. The
balance is settled by avoiding the injury to the property owner only so long as
the governmental body fails to compensate for its loss." Pennsylvania Northwest-
ern, 584 A.2d at 1375 (quoting Bachman v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 494 A.2d 1102,
1106 (Pa. 1985)). In Bachman, the appellant had moved a nonconforming bun-
galow onto a different portion of his land. Bachman, 494 A.2d at 1103. The
court concluded that this constituted the institution of a new use, in violation of
the zoning ordinance. Id. at 1106. Accordingly, regulation of a vested property
right was not even at issue in Bachman. Thus, the case does little to buttress the
proposition for which Bachman was cited by the Pennsylvania Northwestern court.
The Pennsylvania Northwestern court also cited Hanna v. Board of Adjustment for
the proposition that the "continuance of nonconforming uses [has been) coun-
tenanced to avoid imposition of [a] hardship on property owner[s] and because
refusal of continuance 'would be of doubtful constitutionality.' " Pennsylvania
Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375 (quoting Hanna v. Board of Adjustment, 183
A.2d 539, 543 (Pa. 1962)). The issue in Hanna was whether, where appellant's
land was presently utilized as a used car business, the appellant could lawfully
utilize his property to erect a gasoline service station, even though doing so
would violate the zoning ordinance. Hanna, 183 A.2d at 540-4 1. Thus, the lan-
guage quoted from Hanna, when viewed in light of the facts of the case, does
little to support the Pennsylvania Northwestern decision.
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Northwestern court cited In re Yocum for the
proposition that "[a] municipality is without power to compel [a] change in [the]
nature of [a] use where property was not restricted when purchased and is [now]
being used for a lawful purpose." Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375
(citing In re Yocum, 141 A.2d 601, 604 (Pa. 1958)). However, the Yocum court
recognized that the Commonwealth may regulate property pursuant to its police
power. Yocum, 141 A.2d at 604.
123. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965) (en banc).
The court stated "[t]o our knowledge, no one has, as yet, been so brash as to
contend that such a pre-existing lawful nonconforming use properly might be
terminated immediately." Id. at 753.
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Additionally, the court erroneously concluded that "a lawful non-
conforming use establishes in [its] owner a vested property right which
cannot be abrogated or destroyed, unless it is a nuisance, it is aban-
doned, or it is extinguished by eminent domain."' 12 5 Dissecting the pre-
ceding assertion yields the following propositions: (1) a lawful
nonconforming use is a vested property right; and (2) a vested property
right can only be abrogated or destroyed if it is a nuisance, if it is aban-
doned or if the government exercises its power of eminent domain. Un-
questionably, the Pennsylvania Northwestern court did not intend to assert
that a municipality lacks the power to regulate vested property rights. 12 6
Rather, implicit in the court's assertion is the conclusion that abrogation
differs from regulation of vested property rights, that the amortization
of a nonconforming use amounts to abrogation rather than regulation
and that abrogation of vested property rights is unconstitutional. 12 7
However, the Pennsylvania Northwestern court's assertion does not with-
stand scrutiny.
By attaching the label of "abrogation" to the effect of Ordinance
No. 243, the court avoided the difficult issue in the case. Properly char-
acterized, the issue in Pennsylvania Northwestern was whether Ordinance
No. 243, which regulated property retroactively, was a permissible or
impermissible regulation of property. It is submitted that eliminating
nonconforming uses retroactively through amortization does not mate-
rially differ from regulating property uses prospectively.128
124. For a discussion of the reasoning employed in these cases, see supra
note 122 and accompanying text.
125. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1375.
126. The proposition that a municipality lacks the power to regulate vested
property rights would not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, the court has previously
permitted municipalities to regulate vested property rights through their inher-
ent police power. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 592 (Pa. 1973) ("[T]he Commonwealth always had a recog-
nized police power to regulate the use of land, and thus could establish stan-
dards for clear air and clean water consistent with the requirements of public
health .... ); see also Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecti-
cut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1339 (Pa. 1986) (state, pursuant to its
police power, may regulate private property to protect free speech); Common-
wealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 416 A.2d 995, 1003
(Pa. 1980) (state may use police power to regulate property, by forcing property
owners to utilize certain technology that reduces pollution).
127. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1376. Quoting language from
the Missouri Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Northwestern court concluded that
"[i]t would be a strange and novel doctrine indeed which would approve a mu-
nicipality taking private property for public use without compensation if the
property was not too valuable and the taking was not too soon." Id. (quoting
Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965) (en banc)).
128. See Mayor of New Castle County v. Rollins Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
475 A.2d 355, 357 (Del. 1984);John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertis-
ing Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709 (Mass. 1975); Sullivan v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 478
A.2d 912, 919-20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
[Vol. 37: p. 161
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For example, suppose that after a year of exhaustively researching
potential locations for her manufacturing plant, Kimberly buys twenty-
five acres of land in Hypotown, Pennsylvania. Suppose further that, by
the time she actually purchased the land in Hypotown, she had ex-
pended $25,000 in legal and other professional fees. In order to
purchase the land, she borrows $2,000,000 from a local bank. Kimberly
projects that, conservatively, the plant should be able to realize a net
profit, after taxes, of $150,000 in the first year of operation. Fearing
that noise, disruption, danger and pollution may be natural concomi-
tants of Kimberly's venture, Hypotown passes Ordinance No. 244,
which amends the existing zoning legislation and re-zones Kimberly's
land for light industrial use only, prohibiting Kimberly's intended use.
The ordinance also contains a Transfer Development Rights (TDRs)
provision. 129 However, Kimberly, in fact, receives no offers from other
landowners with respect to her TDRs. Recognizing Kimberly's disad-
vantaged bargaining position, Ed leases the land from Kimberly at a
price enabling Kimberly merely to service her debt without making a
profit. The ordinance thus deprives Kimberly of the expenditures she
made for professional services, the potential to earn a salary and a
$150,000 net profit in the first year of operations. Although Kimberly
has been deprived of the most profitable use of her land, she has not
been deprived of all reasonable economic use of her land and therefore,
the ordinance would probably be held to be constitutional.' 3 0
In John Donnelly & Sons, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Court, relying
upon language quoted from the United States Supreme Court, concluded that
"[tihe distinction between regulation and outright prohibition is often consid-
ered to be a narrow one: '[t]hat regulation may take the character of prohibition
... is well established by the decisions of this court.' " John Donnelly & Sons, Inc.,
339 N.E.2d at 715 (quoting United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 425 (1919)).
Similarly, the lower Pennsylvania courts have recognized that the distinction
between retroactive abolition of nonconforming uses through amortization and
prospective regulation of vested property rights is merely one of degree. See
Sullivan, 478 A.2d at 919 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 43-44
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954)). Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has dis-
cussed, in dicta, the constitutionality of abolishing a vested property right. See In
re Ammon R. Smith Auto Co., 223 A.2d 683, 684 (Pa. 1966). In Smith, the court
noted that where other states' courts upheld amortization their rationale was
that "the right to limit, restrict or abolish [a use] on one's own property, is based
upon the police power when it is used to reasonably affect health or safety or
morals and is not arbitrary or discriminatory ... it is paramount to the rights of
every property owner." Id. (emphasis added).
129. A TDR is a right granted in a zoning ordinance permitting property
owners to sell unused development rights to other property owners who own
land in certain defined geographic regions. See 6 ROHAN, supra note 1,
§ 6.01[1]. For an example of a TDR, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 114 (1978). For a detailed discussion of Penn Central, see
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
130. See Board of Supervisors v. McClimans, 597 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (appellant could use land for residential purposes, and thus,
ordinance prohibiting strip mining did not constitute taking of appellant's prop-
NOTE
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By way of contrast, suppose that David enters into a three-year lease
with Canal Zone apartments in Hypotown, Pennsylvania, whereby David
is to operate an adult bookstore. Canal Zone is located approximately
900 feet from a school. David agrees to pay Canal Zone $400 per month
in rent and purchases $5,000 in assorted supplies for his new enterprise.
David opens for business on January 8, 1992. Suppose further that, on
January 15, Hypotown, fearing the attraction of criminals, drug addicts
and other undesirables to its city, passes an ordinance prohibiting adult
commercial enterprises from operating within 1000 feet of a school.
David's maximum financial exposure would be the rent of $400 per
month for three years and the supplies totalling $5,000. David's total
loss would be $19,400, whereas Kimberly's loss would be $150,000.
Yet, under the Pennsylvania Northwestern court's reasoning, it is David and
not Kimberly who is protected from governmental interference with pri-
vate property rights.13 1
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania Northwestern court's distinction
between abrogating and regulating vested property rights is artificial in
the context of the amortization of nonconforming uses and that any dif-
ference between the two is merely one of degree. 132 Regulation of
vested property rights is permitted in Pennsylvania.' 3 3 Accordingly, the
Pennsylvania Northwestern court erred by concluding that vested property
rights could only be abrogated by nuisance, abandonment or by the gov-
ernment's exercise of eminent domain.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA NORTHWESTERN DECISION
The Pennsylvania Northwestern court defended its decision on policy
grounds. Specifically, the court suggested that permitting the amortiza-
tion of nonconforming uses would often result in economic waste and
would permit local governments to legislate any use, including a private
residence, out of existence. 134 However, it is suggested that these pol-
erty even though appellant had entered into commercial lease for purpose of
strip mining).
131. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Northwestern court's reasoning, see
supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
132. For a compilation of courts that have characterized the distinction be-
tween regulating property prospectively and terminating property rights retro-
actively through amortization as merely one of degree, see supra note 14.
133. For authority supporting the proposition that regulation of vested
property rights is permitted in Pennsylvania, see supra note 126.
134. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1376. Specifically, the court
stated that
It is clear that were we to permit the amortization of nonconform-
ing uses in this Commonwealth, any use could be amortized out of
existence without just compensation. Although such a zoning option
seems reasonable when the use involves some activity that may be dis-
tasteful to some members of the public, no use would be exempt from
the reach of amortization, and any property owner could lose the use of
his or her property without compensation. Even a homeowner could
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icy arguments are suspect and that, in fact, the proscription of amortiza-
tion will lead to economic waste and stagnation in the development of
effective land-use planning. 135
First, the failure to permit amortization of nonconforming uses ar-
guably promotes economic waste. 13 6 As discussed earlier in this Note, a
nonconforming use enjoys an artificial monopoly and thus generates
profits that the market would not ordinarily sustain given the normal
pressures of supply and demand. 17 These excess profits drain from the
community money that could be applied to more productive ends.
138
By allowing for the protection of certain monopolies, the Pennsylvania
Northwestern decision arguably fosters economic waste, and ironically,
may actually diminish property owners' ability to utilize their
property. 139
The court's suggestion that permitting municipalities to amortize
nonconforming uses may ultimately result in the amortization of our
find one day that his or her "castle" had become a nonconforming use
and would be required to vacate the premises within some arbitrary
period of time, without just compensation. Such a result is repugnant to a
basic protection accorded in this Commonwealth to vested property
interests.
Id.
135. For a criticism of the court's policy arguments, see infra notes 136-40
and accompanying text.
136. The argument that amortization would foster economic waste is ar-
ticulated in Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Approach, supra note 4, at
104. The author concludes that "forced destruction [through amortization] will
often result in economic waste." Id. The author further concludes that:
Avoidance of economic waste supplies, in addition, an argument
against indiscriminate use of the power of eminent domain. In the case
of highly specialized buildings the public benefit of discontinuing their
use by eminent domain would be trifling compared to the resultant
waste. Even where the improvements are not so specialized and could
be readily converted to a conforming use, the reconstruction necessary
to relocate the activity may be quite wasteful. A further aspect of eco-
nomic waste concerns extraction operations, such as mining and quar-
rying, which must be confined to the places where the materials can be
found. Here, especially if the commodity is essential, there may be
good reason to allow continuance, to liberalize the rules against expan-
sion and even to permit operation of quarries not yet opened in order
to utilize the materials.
Id. This reasoning is questioned infra at notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of why the nonconforming use becomes a monopoly,
see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
138. See Bernard Lau, Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby: A
Political Question, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 187, 201 (1991) (suggesting that near-mo-
nopoly status of public school system hinders efficient allocation of resources).
But see Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 297, 307 (1991) (natural monopolies resulting from economies
of scale improve efficiency).
139. It seems conceivable that local zoning boards will be more reluctant to
grant variances knowing that the grant of the variance will create a vested prop-
erty right that cannot be amortized.
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homes is also unpersuasive. Specifically, such an assertion ignores the
limits placed upon the Commonwealth's regulatory power. In Penn-
sylvania, "all property is held in subordination to the right of its reason-
able regulation by the government, which regulation is clearly necessary
to preserve the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the peo-
ple."' 140 It would not be difficult for a homeowner, in challenging such
an ordinance, to establish that amortizing homes in a residential area is
not clearly necessary to further the health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the people.
V. CONCLUSION
Naturally, one resists the idea that the government should be able
to interfere with our vested property rights. However, individuals de-
rive benefits from an orderly society, one in which uses of land are regu-
lated to balance property owners' and society's needs adequately.141
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania Northwestern court failed to ade-
quately balance individual property rights with society's needs. The
Pennsylvania Northwestern court misconstrued precedent and, as a matter
of policy, rendered a decision that may ultimately diminish individuals'
ability to use their property in a way that benefits both the property
owner and the society of which the property owner is a part. This was
unnecessary. To the extent that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
wanted to give property rights greater protection vis-a-vis municipali-
ties, the court could have accomplished this objective through recogni-
tion and proper application of taking jurisprudence. Specifically, the
court could have recognized the constitutionality of amortization as a
means of land-use planning, while concluding that it was unreasonable
to require Pa. Northwestern to cease its operations in only ninety
days.14 2 Such an approach would have given local legislatures a much-
needed device to help them plan their respective communities, and at
the same time would have given property owners all the protection to
which they are entitled under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Barry Gosin
140. Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1374 (quoting Anstine v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 190 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. 1963)).
141. See Drumm, supra note 1, at 855. Aptly, the author states:
As the growth of America's metropolitan areas continues to accel-
erate, it has become increasingly necessary to rely on governmental so-
lutions to the problem of fashioning a liveable metropolitan
environment. A principal method used to achieve this goal has been
the application of comprehensive zoning ordinances; with their use, the
growth of a city may be monitored and directed to provide efficient
municipal services, to maximize land values and the tax base, and to
allow for consideration of environmental and aesthetic factors.
Id.
142. See Pennsylvania Northwestern, 584 A.2d at 1378 (Nix, C.J., concurring).
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